Obergefell’s Prescription: Why the Fourteenth Amendment  Trumps State Employees’ Free Exercise Claims by McKechnie, Douglas B.
21 
OBERGEFELL’S PRESCRIPTION: WHY THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TRUMPS STATE 
EMPLOYEES’ FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS 
By: Douglas B. McKechnie* 
Following the Supreme Court’s recent decision finding a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 some 
politicians and public employees have asserted an ostensible First 
Amendment right to refuse to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.  For example, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton declared in 
an official opinion letter that Texas state employees retain the right to 
rely on their “religious freedoms” and “religious objections” and refuse 
to issue same-sex marriage licenses.2  However, neither the Attorney 
General’s opinion, nor any current or future concocted state law, nor the 
First Amendment will allow such religiously based refusals to comply 
with the Obergefell decision—the court’s own Free Exercise 
jurisprudence has seen to that. 
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court announced that the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the government to 
meet a strict scrutiny standard if a law substantially burdened citizens’ 
rights to the free exercise of religion.3  In that case, a religious adherent 
was fired from her job after refusing to work on the day of her Sabbath. 
She filed for, and was denied, unemployment compensation because the 
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1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2. Letter Op. No. KP-0025 from Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen., to Honorable Dan
Patrick, Lt. Gov. at 1 (June 28, 2015), available at 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php?id=5144. 
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
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state found her religious justification for refusing to work unacceptable.4  
The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and found that denying Ms. 
Sherbert unemployment benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.5  The court reasoned that the state’s eligibility 
restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant 
burden on Sherbert’s ability to freely exercise her faith.  Furthermore, 
there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial 
burden on this basic First Amendment right. 
Nearly thirty years later, the Supreme Court decided Employment 
Division v. Smith,6 which sharply limited the potential application of 
strict scrutiny in favor of a rational basis test.  In that case, two Native 
Americans, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were fired from their jobs for 
ingesting peyote—a powerful hallucinogen—as part of a sacrament of 
their church.7  The two filed for unemployment compensation but were 
denied because the state in which they resided, Oregon, prohibited the 
possession and use of peyote.8  The state refused to award them benefits 
because of their use of this illegal drug despite their religious purpose.9  
Smith and Black claimed that the refusal to award unemployment 
compensation was a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.10  They argued that Oregon’s denial of unemployment 
compensation did not meet the strict scrutiny standard as required by 
court precedent.11  Thus, under strict scrutiny, Oregon’s law 
substantially burdened their free exercise of religion, Oregon lacked a 
compelling governmental interest, and the law was not narrowly tailored 
to accomplish this governmental interest.12  The court disagreed with 
their argument and held that if a law is one of general application, not 
intentionally targeted at religion,13 then the constitutionality of the law is 
tested under the rational basis test.  To the likely chagrin of some state 
employees who object to Obergefell, the religious adherents in 
Employment Division were faced with a court that wanted to return to a 
4. Id. at 399-401. 
5. Id. at 403, 408-09. 
6. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 




11. Id. at 882-83. 
12. See generally, Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07. 
13. See generally, Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 881 (The court noted that at times strict
scrutiny will be appropriate when an individual claims that a law regulates religiously motivated 
action in conjunction with another constitutionally protected liberty such as speech or press). 
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rational basis standard, or a pre-Sherbert interpretation14 of the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
The court in Employment Division determined that the Free 
Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a valid and [religious-]neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
religion prescribes (or proscribes).”15  The court reasoned that because 
Oregon’s law proscribed the use of peyote without being animated by its 
religious significance, Smith and Black’s religious motivation for failing 
to comply with the law was immaterial.16  Indeed, the Court held “a 
stance of conscientious opposition [never] relieves an objector from any 
colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.”17  If the individual is 
free to disregard laws that fail to coincide with his own religious beliefs, 
then the individual will “become a law unto himself.”18  These are the 
principles that animate (or undergird) the Free Exercise Clause rights 
invoked by some who intend to ignore Obergefell and the dictates of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Obergefell, the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
compels states to issue same-sex couples marriage licenses where they 
also issue opposite-sex couples marriage licenses.19  In other words, the 
citizens of the United States, through the democratically enacted 
Fourteenth Amendment, require the states to offer marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples.20  Indeed, the Constitution, either in the text or as 
interpreted by the court, is full of proscriptions and prescriptions.  For 
example, the Constitution proscribes an individual from being President 
of the United States if he or she is under the age of 35.21  Moreover, the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment would prescribe the 
issuance of a permit to someone wishing to hold a demonstration if he 
otherwise met the threshold articulated by a parade permitting law.22  
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes the right to same-sex 
marriage.  Yet states, like corporations, can only act through human 
14. See e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890). 
15. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16. Id. at 884. 
17. Id. at 882 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 461(1971); internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
18. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879); internal
quotation marks omitted).  
19. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4250, *42 (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
20. Id. 
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
22. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (U.S. 1969). 
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beings in the form of elected officials and employees.  The question then 
arises: who is compelled, in a practical sense, to effectuate the 
prescriptions found in the Constitution and empower the fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage found in the Fourteenth Amendment? 
Certainly same-sex couples cannot issue marriage licenses to 
themselves.  Issuing marriage licenses is a function of the state and an 
act that must be performed by the state.  Therefore, the Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental right to same sex-marriage is only realized 
with a concomitant prescription to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.  That prescription falls upon the state and, ultimately, the 
employee whose duties include issuing marriage licenses.  Therefore, a 
state employee who refuses to issue a marriage license to a same-sex 
couple because they are the same sex is acting on behalf of the state. 
Upon a state employee’s refusal to issue such a marriage license, the 
state, in that moment, violates the couple’s Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.23 
Concededly, these state employees have free exercise rights under 
the First Amendment.  Indeed, state laws24 and administrative opinions25 
seem to attempt to reassert or bolster state employees’ free exercise 
rights while at the same time positioning those rights as an affirmative 
defense to a same-sex couple’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.  Thus a 
conflict emerges: a state employee that is constitutionally duty bound to 
issue same-sex marriage licenses may have a free exercise interest and 
state law “right” to opt-out of issuing same-sex marriage licenses.  This 
Fourteenth Amendment prescription tips the justice scale in favor of one 
position, while the First Amendment and state law balance out the other 
side of the scale. 
It goes without saying that the Fourteenth Amendment, and any 
prescriptions found therein, is superior to state law or administrative 
opinions.  If the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes an act by the state, 
and by extension a state employee, the state is utterly powerless to 
authorize the employee to opt-out of the prescription.  Accordingly, the 
Fourteenth Amendment certainly trumps state law.  However, as 
discussed above, state law is not the only law on which the employee 
might rely.  The employee may believe, from a religious perspective, 
23. Whether a state employee can, in keeping with the Constitution, refuse to issue a
marriage license for reasons not specifically addressed by the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this piece.  
24. NC S.B. 2 (2015). 
25. Rights Of Government Officials Involved With Issuing Same-Sex Marriage Licenses
And Conducting Same-Sex Wedding Ceremonies, TX Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0025 (2015). 
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that same-sex marriage is an abomination.  To be sure, the Free Exercise 
Clause protects “first and foremost, the right to believe and profess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires.”26  The employee may then feel 
compelled by his or her truly held religious beliefs to deny the same-sex 
couple a license.  It is then a conflict between the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment that must be resolved. 
As discussed in Employment Division, government inevitably 
places prescriptions on its citizens through the democratic process.27  
Most often those prescriptions come in the form of state or federal 
legislation requiring an act by a citizen.  Those prescriptions are, of 
course, subordinate to the Constitution and must comply with its 
protections—including the Free Exercise Clause.28  In the conflict 
described above, however, the prescription derives not from middling 
legislation but rather the democratically enacted Fourteenth Amendment 
itself.  Therefore, if an employee relies on the First Amendment to refuse 
to issue same-sex marriage licenses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
prescription must be held up against the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Free Exercise Clause.  One amendment need not be subservient to 
the other; instead they must be read in conjunction in light of the 
jurisprudence that has brought them to life.  In such a situation, the Free 
Exercise Clause provides no safe-harbor. 
Ultimately, the Constitution, while peerless and revered, is merely a 
set of democratically enacted laws.  The Fourteenth Amendment, which 
encompasses the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection rights 
therein, and any prescriptions that flow from these rights, are part of 
those laws.  There is no credible argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is anything but a valid, religion-neutral, generally 
applicable law.  The text of the amendment does not refer to religion or 
seek to prescribe or proscribe actions simply because of their religious 
nature.29  Moreover, the Substantive Due Process rights found in the 
amendment are equally religion-neutral and generally applicable.30  
They are simply secular rights that exist irrespective of religion. 
To be sure, it is possible that all of the rights and concomitant 
26. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877. 
27. Id. at 882. 
28. See generally, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
30. “In addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, . . . to have children, . . . 
to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, . . . to marital privacy, . . . to use 
contraception, . . . to bodily integrity, . . . and to abortion . . . .” Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720 (1997) (citations omitted). 
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prescriptions (or proscriptions) found in the Fourteenth Amendment 
impose upon one religious belief or another, but that alone does not 
undermine them pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause.  The legal dictates 
of the Fourteenth Amendment would only give way to the Free Exercise 
Clause if they were motivated by religious animosity.31  A public 
employee’s constitutional obligation to issue a same-sex marriage 
license certainly may impose upon the employee’s truly held religious 
belief.  However, “[t]he mere possession of religious convictions which 
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the 
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.”32 
The court in Obergefell was clear that its decision does not compel 
religious institutions to recognize or even condone same-sex marriage.33  
Of course that is true because the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to 
the states and federal government.  However, that application to the 
states compels them to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.34  
Every refusal to do so is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That 
violation occurs whether the state acts as a sovereign entity through 
legislative or executive action or through a single employee’s refusal to 
issue such a license.  Neither state law nor the Free Exercise Clause can 
function as an opt-out or defense for the failure to comply with the 
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As the court in Employment 
Division held, the First Amendment “does not relieve an individual of 
the obligation to comply” with the Fourteenth Amendment.35  If it did, 
the Free Exercise Clause would permit state employees to flout the 
democratic will of the people as expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment 
and “become a law unto [themselves].”36 
31. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 532. 
32. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 U.S. LEXIS at 48-49. 
34. Id. at 42. 
35. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879. 
36. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879); internal
quotation marks omitted).  
